Abstract. It is known that a two-person game form g is Nash-solvable if and only if it is tight [12, 13] . We strengthen the concept of tightness as follows: game form is called totally tight if every its 2 × 2 subform is tight. (It is easy to show that in this case all, not only 2 × 2, subforms are tight.) We characterize totally tight game forms and derive from this characterization that they are tight, Nashsolvable, dominance-solvable, acyclic, and assignable. In particular, total tightness and acyclicity are equivalent properties of two-person game forms.
Introduction
We consider the following six classes of two-person game forms: tight (T), totally tight (TT), Nash-solvable (NS), dominance-solvable (DS), acyclic (AC), and assignable (AS) ones, and prove the following implications:
Some of them are known, while others follow from a characterization of the TT game forms obtained in this paper. We also give examples showing that no other implication holds for the considered six properties.
Game forms and games
A (two-person) game form is a mapping g : X 1 ×X 2 → A, where X 1 (rows) and X 2 (columns) are the strategies of players 1 and 2, while A is a set of outcomes. In this paper we restrict ourselves by finite two-person game forms, that is, the above three sets, X 1 , X 2 , and A are finite. Three examples are given in Figure 1 . Furthermore, let u : {1, 2} × A → R be a utility (or payoff ) function. Given a player i ∈ {1, 2} and an outcome a ∈ A, the value u(i, a) is interpreted as the profit of the player i in case when the outcome a is realized. The pair (g, u) defines a normal form (bimatrix) game. A payoff u is called zero-sum if u(1, a) + u(2, a) = 0 for each a ∈ A. In this case (g, u) is a matrix game.
However, in general (for non-zero-sum games), the similar statement does not hold; see, for example, [15] or [5] .
A game form g is called Nash-solvable (NS) if for each payoff u the obtained game (g, u) has a NE. Respectively, g is called zero-sum-solvable if for each zero-sum payoff u the obtained zero-sum game (g, u) has a saddle point.
Effectivity functions, game forms, and criteria of solvability
Given a game form g : X 1 × X 2 → A, we say that a player i ∈ {1, 2} is effective for a subset of outcomes B ⊆ A if i has a strategy x i ∈ X i such that g(x i , x 3−i ) ∈ B for every strategy x 3−i ∈ X 3−i of the opponent. In this case we set E i (B) = 1 and E i (B) = 0 otherwise. Thus, two Boolean functions E g i : 2
A → {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, are associated with every game form g. The pair (E g 1 , E g 2 ) is called the effectivity function (EFF) of g; see [20, 19, 21] for more detail. Obviously, equalities E g 1 (B) = E g 2 (A \ B) = 1 hold for no g, since every row and column in X 1 × X 2 intersect. In contast, E g 1 (B) = E g 2 (A \ B) = 0 might hold. For example, let us consider game form g in Figure 1 and set B = {a 1 } (or B = {a 2 }). Then E g 1 (B) = E g 2 (A \ B) = 0, since all rows and columns contain both a 1 and a 2 .
A game form g is called tight if E 
For example, game forms g and g in Figure 1 are tight, while g is not.
Given a game form g, let us assign to each outcome a ∈ A a Boolean variable and denote it for simplicity by the same symbol a. Then, rows and columns of g naturally define two monotone disjunctive normal forms (DNFs) that represent, respectively, E g 1 and E g 2 :
It is not difficult to verify that a game form g is tight if and only if its two DNFs D
d . This equation is just a reformulation of (2). For example, for the three game forms g, g and g in Figure 1 we have:
Hence, g and g are tight, while g is not.
Theorem 2. ( [12] , see also [13] and [4] ). The following three properties of a game form are equivalent: tightness, Nash-solvability, and zero-sum-solvability.
For the zero-sum case this claim was proved earlier by Edmonds and Fulkerson [7] and independently in [11] . RRR 6-2008 To verify tightness of a game form is an exciting open problem of complexity theory, socalled dualization. No polynomial algorithm is still known. However, it is very unlikely that dualization is NP-hard, since there is a quasi-polynomial recognition algorithm suggested by Fredman and Khachiyan [8] . Its complexity, N o(log N ) = 2 o(N 2 ) is closer to polynomials 2 c log N than to exponents 2 cN , where c is a constant and N is the input complexity.
Totally tight and irreducible game forms; main theorem
We will call a game form g totally tight (TT) if each of its 2 × 2 subforms is tight.
Proposition 3. Totally tight game forms are tight.
Proof. Let g be a TT game form and g be an arbitrary its 2 × 2 subform. By definition, g is tight and, by Theorem 2, it is zero-sum-solvable. Then, by Theorem 1, g is zero-sum-solvable and, by Theorem 2, g is tight.
By definition, total tightness of a game form can be verified in polynomial time.
Given a game form g : X 1 × X 2 → A, a strategy x 1 ∈ X 1 and the corresponding row (respectively, x 2 ∈ X 2 and the corresponding column) is called constant if there is an outcome a ∈ A such that g(x 1 , x 2 ) ≡ a for all x 2 ∈ X 2 (respectively, for all x 1 ∈ X 1 ).
A game form g is called reducible if it has a constant line, row or column.
It is easy to verify that a 2 × 2 game form is reducible if and only if it is tight. For example, in Figure 1 , game form g is tight and reducible (its first row is constant), while g is not tight and not reducible.
Let us remark that, by the above definition, an m × n game form is reducible whenever m = 1 or n = 1. Indeed, in this case each column or, respectively, row is constant. Moreover, formally, even a 1 × 1 game form is reducible, although there is no game form to reduce it to. By convention, let us say that it is reduced to the empty game form.
By definition, the reducibility of a game form can be veryfied in linear time.
A game form will be called totally reducible if it can be reduced to the empty one by successive elimination of constant lines. In [17] these game forms are called semi-dictatorial. For example, g in Figure 1 is such a game form. More generally, given a game form g, let us eliminate successively its constant lines until we obtain an irreducible game form g which might be empty or not.
Proposition 5. Game form g is well-defined, that is, unique. Moreover, g is TT if and only if g is TT.
Proof. Again, it is obvious.
In Section 2, we will prove that all such (non-empty irreducible TT) game forms have the same effectivity function. This, so-called 2-majority, EFF E = E 3 2 is defined as follows: three exist three outcomes a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ A such that each player i ∈ {1, 2} is effective for any two of them, E i ({a 1 , a 2 }) = E i ({a 1 , a 3 }) = E i ({a 2 , a 3 }) = 1, and, of course, for every superset of such a subset of cardinality 2, as well.
Theorem 6. Every non-empty irreducible TT game form g has a 2-majority effectivity function, that is, there are outcomes a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ A such that E
This result clarifies the structure of a TT game form g "almost completely": g is either totally reducible, or it is reduced to an irreducible game form g with a 2-majority EFF.
Somewhat surprisingly, even under this (very strong) restriction it appears not that easy to characterize the TT game forms explicitly. However, in Section 3 a characterization of the following type is obtained: we construct recursively an infinite family of TT game forms and show that each TT game form is a subform of a game form from this family.
Furthermore, in Section 4 we prove that TT game forms are (i) acyclic, (ii) dominancesolvable, and (iii) assignable; see the next three subsections for the definitions. Recently, (i) was proved, while (ii) and (iii)) conjectured by Kukushkin, [17] .
Results (i) and (ii) are significantly strengthened and generalized in [3] , see also [2] .
Acyclic game forms
Given positive integral m, n and k such that 2 ≤ k ≤ min(m, n), a m × n bimatrix game (g, u), and k distinct strategies of each player, x
Adding and eliminating constant lines, rows and/or columns; g is NS (tight) but not DS; g is not tight; g is assignable but not tight; g is the A-extension of g .
Dominance-solvable game forms
Given a game (g, u) and two strategies x i , x i ∈ X i of a player i ∈ {1, 2}, we say that x i is dominated by [18] , [19] Chapter 5, or [9] .
Although, in general, the result might depend on the order in which dominated strategies are eliminated, yet, there are simple conditions under which the above procedure and concept of domination are well-defined; namely, when utility functions u i : A → R of both players are injective; in other words, when u(1, a) = u(1, a ) if and only if u(2, a) = u(2, a ) for all a, a ∈ A; see [18] , [19] Chapter 5, or [9] again.
A game form g is called dominance-solvable (DS) if for any payoff u the obtained game (g, u) is DS. Obviously, DS ⇒ N S, since, as we already mentioned, each DE is a NE. Yet, the inverse implication does not hold. For example, game form g in Figure 2 is tight and, hence, NS but it is not DS; there is no DE if both players prefer a 2 to a 1 . Proposition 8. Totally tight game forms are dominance-solvable.
In Section 4, we derive this implication from Theorem 6; see [1] for an independent proof. Up to our knowledge, the complexity of verifying if a given game form is DS is open.
Assignable game forms
Let us call a game form g :
It is easy to verify that all seven game forms in Figures 1 and 2 and even g in Figure 3 are assignable, while g is not.
The concept of assignability was suggested by Kukushkin (private communications); he conjectured that the following implication holds. Figure 3 : Game form g is tight and DS but not TT and not AS. Tightness and dominance-solvability are not hereditary properties Proposition 9. Totally tight game forms are assignable.
In Section 4 we will derive this statement from Theorem 6.
It is easy to see that all 2 × 2 game forms, as well game forms with only two outcomes, are assignable. In particular, g in Figure 2 is AS, yet, it is not tight. On the contrary, game form g in Figure 3 is tight and DS but not AS.
Veryfying whether a given game form g : X 1 × X 2 → A is assignable can be executed in polynomial time, since this problem is polynomially reduced, for example, to 2-satisfyabnility.
Indeed, let us consider g and two more mappings g 1 : X 1 → A and g 2 : X 2 → A. Given i ∈ I = {1, 2}, a strategy x i ∈ X i , and an outcome a ∈ A, let us define a Boolean variable y = y(x i , a) as follows: y = 1 if g i (x i ) = a and y = 0 otherwise. Then, let us consider a 2-CNF
It is easily seen that this CNF C(g) is satisfiable if and only if the corresponding game form g is assignable. Indeed, in CNF (4) the first conjunction is equal to 1 if and only if at most one outcome a ∈ A is assigned by a mapping g i to each strategy x i ∈ X i for i ∈ {1, 2}; respectively, the second conjunction of (4) equals 1 if and only if g(
Let us remark, however, that the above arguments hold only for two-person game forms.
As we already mentioned, all 2 × 2 game forms are assignable. Moreover, for 2 × 2 game forms the following six properties are equivbalent: T, TT, DS, NS, AC, and reducibility.
Hereditary properties
Given a game form g : X 1 × X 2 → A (respectively, a game (g, u)) and a pair of subsets X 1 ⊆ X 1 , X 2 ⊆ X 2 , standardly a subform g of g and subgame (g , u) of (g, u) is defined by the restriction of g to
A property P of a game (g, u) (game form g) is called hereditary if P holds for any subgame (g , u) of (g, u)) (subform g of g) whenever P holds for (g, u) (for g) itself.
By definitions, TT, AC, and AS are hereditary properties of game forms. In contrast, properties T, NS, and DS can disappear even after eliminating a constant line, row or column.
For example, game form g in Figure 2 is DS; hence, it is NS and tight, too. Yet, eliminating its second (constant) row we obtain game form g that has none of these three properties; for example, it is not tight, since its Boolean functions E g 1 = a 1 and E g 2 = a 1 a 2 are not dual.
Adding and eliminating constant lines; A-extensions
Given a game form g :
≡ a for every x 2 ∈ X 2 and a ∈ A. In other words, we extend X 1 by adding p = |A| constant strategies x a for all ooutcomes a ∈ A. For example, in Figure 2 game form g is the row A-extension of g . Similarly, we introduce the column A-extension g
It is easy to verify that for an arbitrary game form g both its A-extensions are tight, NS, and DS; furthermore they are TT, AC, or AS if and only if g has the corresponding property.
Let us consider three transformations of game forms: A-extension, eliminating and adding a constant line. (For example, A-extension itself was defined as adding p = |A| constant lines, one for each outcome a ∈ A.)
The following meta-language will simplify our statements. We say that a property P is treated by a transformation T and consider three transformations defined above, our standard six properties partitioned in two triplets, X = {T, N S, DS} and Y = {T T, AC, AS}, and the following four types of treatment. We apply T to a game form g, obtain a transformed game form g , and say that:
P is encouraged by T if P cannot disappear (but, maybe, it can appear); P is discouraged by T if P cannot appear (but, maybe, it can disappear); P is respected by T if P can neither appear, nor disappear; P is enforced by T if P cannot disappear and must appear.
P is denied by T if P cannot appear and must disappear. Proof. It is tedious, since there are very many cases, but simple.
For example, let us notice that Nash-or dominance-solvability of a game form g cannot disappear after g is extended by a constant strategy x 0 i of a player i = 1 or i = 2. Indeed, although x 0 i might "kill" a NE or DE in the game (g, u), yet obviously, in this case a new one (related to x 0 i ) must appear in the transformed game. We leave the analysis of numerous remaining cases to the careful reader.
All cases of Theorem 10 are summarized in two tables given in Figure 4 . The set of properties X = {T, N S, DS} can be extended to X = {T, N S, DS, ∃N E, ∃DE}, where the last two properties are related to games rather than to game forms and mean that a game has a NE or, respectively, DE. If we substitute X for X the modified Theorem 10 will still hold.
Equivalent definitions and main corollaries of total tightness
Let us summarize some of the above observations.
Theorem 11. The following twelve properties of a game form g are equivalent:
every 2×2 subform of g is (1) tight, (2) Nash-solvable, (3) zero-sum-solvable, (4) dominancesolvable, (5) acyclic; furthermore, every subform g of g is (1 ) tight, (2 ) Nash-solvable, (3 ) zero-sum-solvable, (4 ) dominance-soilvable, (5 ) acyclic; finally, g itself is (6) acyclic, and (7) totally tight.
In particular, total tightness and acyclicity are equivalent. In Section 4, we will prove that total tightness implies acyclicity, assignability, and dominance-solvability.
Furthermore, it is well-known that dominance-solvability implies Nash-solvability, see, for example, [19, 9] , and that Nash-solvability is equivalent to tightness [12, 13] . Let us also recall that total tightness implies tightness, by Proposition 3.
Relations between main classes of two-person game forms are summarized by (1). Let us underline that no other implications hold. Indeed, in Figure 2 , game form g is tight but not DS, while g is AS but not tight; furthermore, g in Figure 3 is DS but not TT and not AS. Another large family of DS but not TT game forms is related to veto-voting; see manuscript [10] and also [1] . 2 ∨ a 2 a 3 ∨ a 3 a 1 . However, the inverse does not hold and it is not easy to characterize TT game forms explicitly. In Section 3 we obtain recursively an infinite family of them and show that each TT game form is a subform of a game form from this family.
Let us
Remark 3. Let us notice that the above important necessary conditions for acyclicity (or equivalently, for total tightness) of a two-person game form are given in terms of its effectivity function. Somewhat surprisingly, many properties of game forms can be characterized in such terms. For example, a two-person game form g is Nash-solvable if and only if it is tight, that is, its effectivity function is self-dual. More example can be found in [14] .
Proof of Theorem 6
Let g be a totally tight game form. By Proposition 3, g is tight, that is, the corresponding two monotone Boolean functions E g 1 and E g 2 are dual. Yet, Theorem 6 claims much more, namely, all TT game forms generate the same self-dual pair:
Game correspondences and associated game forms
A game correspondence is defined as a mapping G :
A . In other words, to each situation (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 we assign a subset of outcomes G(x 1 , x 2 ) ⊆ A. If |G(x 1 , x 2 )| = 1 for all situations (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 , we obtain a game form.
In general, with a game correspondence G we associate k = (x 1 ,x 2 )∈X 1 ×X 2 |G(x 1 , x 2 )| game forms g ∈ G, by choosing for each situation (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 an outcome g(x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ G(x 1 , x 2 ). Let us notice that k = 0 whenever G(x 1 , x 2 ) = ∅ for at least one situation.
We will say that g ∈ G is associated with G and call G (totally) tight if k > 0 and at least one g ∈ G is (totally) tight.
Game correspondences associated with pairs of dual monotone DNFs or Boolean functions
First, let us recall the following two well-known properties of dual monotone Boolean functions that will be instrumental for our analysis. majority voting game correspondence; only 2 from 8 game forms associated with this game correspondence are TT; see, e.g., g in Figure 1 .
(
Given arbitrary monotone (that is, negation-free) DNFs
B x 2 over the set of variables A, let us define a game correspondence Figure 5 , where
Lemma 13. ( [13] , see also [22] ). If D 1 and D 2 are dual then game correspondence
is tight. In particular, in this case G(x 1 , x 2 ) = ∅ for all (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 ; moreover, all associated game forms g ∈ G have the same Boolean functions E 
Proof. It follows immediately from Lemma 12 (i) and (ii).
Let us recall that, by definition, G is TT if at least one g ∈ G is TT. However, in contrast with tightness, this does not mean that all g ∈ G are TT. Let us consider, for example, game correspondence G in Figure 5 . Only two game forms associated with G are TT (one of them is g in Figure 1 , while it is easy to verify that the remaining six are not TT.
Given a DNF D, let D 0 denote the corresponding irredundant DNF, that is, disjunction of all prime (irreducible) implicants of D.
Proof. The "only if part" immediately follows, since total tightness is a hereditary property of game forms and game correspondences.
Lemma 15. A subcorrespondence G of G is TT whenever G is TT.
Let us prove the "if part". By assumption, there is a TT game form g
2 . Let us extend it to a TT game form g ∈ G = G D 1 ,D 2 as follows. For i = 1, 2 to each strategy Figure 6 : No TT game form is associated with this game correspondence.
Totally tight Boolean functions
Thus, we can restrict ourselves by dual pairs of irredundant DNFs. In other words, keeping in mind the characterization of TT game forms, we will take as the input a monotone Boolean function E rather than a game form g. Given E, we set E 1 = E and E 2 = E d , consider the corresponding irredundant DNFs D 
2 . We will call E TT if G is TT, or in other words, if there is a TT g ∈ G. By construction, E is TT if and only if E d is TT. Let us consider several examples.
It is easy to see that every two prime implicants, one of E and the other of E d , have exactly one variable in common. (This is a characteristic property of so-called monotone read-once Boolean functions; see [6] , Chapter 12.) In other words, game correspondence G E is, in fact, a game form, since |G E (x 1 , x 2 )| = 1 for every situation (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 . This gameform g is shown on Figure 3 . However, this game form is not TT, since it has a 2 × 2 subform g that is not tight, see Figure 3 .
In general, G E is a game form, G E = g E , if and only if E is read-once. It is not difficult to show that in this case E is TT if and only if g E is totally reducible; see Proposition 4. (This is a characteristic property of so-called monotone threshold Boolean functions; see [6] , Part II, Chapter 10.) However, we are looking for irreducible TT game forms.
As another example, let us consider
It is easy to check that G E is not TT, since it contains a 2 × 2 subform g ; see Figure 6 . A case analysis might be needed for more difficult examples. Let E = E 5 3 := {i,j,k}⊆{1,2,3,4,5} a i a j a k , where i, j, and k are pairwise distinct triplets; in other words, E = 1 if and only if at least 3 out of its 5 variables are equal to 1. To show that G E is not TT let us consider its 4 × 4 subcorrespondence G given in Figure 7 (where, to save space, we substitute only the subscript j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} for a j ). Let us choose an arbitrary game form g ∈ G. Due to obvious symmetry, we can choose a 1 from {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }, without any loss of generality. Yet, in this case G already contains a 2 × 2 subconfiguration G that is clearly not TT; see Figure 7 . Hence, g cannot be TT and, by Lemma 15, G and G E are not TT, either.
The following Lemma is instrumental in characterizing TT Boolean functions. Given E, let us choose two of its distinct prime implicants and denote by B, B ⊆ A the corresponding two set of variables. Obviously, B \ B = ∅ and B \ B = ∅. Proof. Let us assume indirectly that |B \ B | ≥ 2 and |B \ B| ≥ 2, say, a 1 , a 2 ∈ B \ B and a 3 , a 4 ∈ B \ B, where a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 ∈ A are four pairwise distinct outcomes, yet, E is TT.
By Lemma 12 (ii), there are four prime implicants of E d whose sets of variables B 1 , B 2 ,
Let us fix a game form g ∈ G E and consider the corresponding 2 × 4 subform g in g; it is given in Figure 8 , where the first (second) row is assigmed to B (respectively, to B ) and it contains a 1 and a 2 (respectively, a 3 and a 4 ). 
Irreducible TT Boolean functions are self-dual
There is a simple characterization of reducibility of a game form in Boolean terms.
Lemma 17. Game correspondence G E contains a constant row (column) whose every entry is an outcome a ∈ A if and only if E = a ∨ E (respectively, E d = a ∨ E ). In both cases, every associated game form g ∈ G E is reducible.
Proof. It follows immediately from the definitions.
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Thus, we can reformulate Theorem 6 as follows: If E is TT then either E = a ∨ E or
In first two cases we will call E reducible.
Lemma 18. If E is TT and irreducible then every two of its prime implicants have a variable in common.
Proof. Let us assume indirectly that there are two prime implicants of E with disjoint set of variables B, B ⊆ A. By Lemma 17, if E is TT then |B| = 1 or |B | = 1, in other words, E is reducible and we get a contradiction.
Proof. It is both obvious and well-known (see, for example, [6] ) that E is dual-minor,
Furthetmore, we will show that only one self-dual function is TT, all other are not. For example, let us consider the classical function associated with the Fano projective plane:
It is well-known and not difficult to verify that E F is self-dual,
F . Yet, by Lemma 16, E F is not TT. Indeed, rows {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }, {a 3 , a 4 , a 5 } and columns {a 0 , a 1 , a 4 }, {a 0 , a 2 , a 5 } form a 2 × 2 game form that is not tight.
As another example, let us recall that the 3-majority EFF E(
) is self-dual but not TT; see Figure 7 .
The only TT self-dual Boolean functions is the 2-wheel
Let us consider one more example. The so-called k-wheel is defined for k ≥ 2 by formula
Again, it is well-known and easy to check that E k is self-dual,
Game correspondences, G E k are given in Figure 9 for k = 2, 3, and in general. (Again, to save space we substitute for an outcome a j only its subscript j.) Let us fix an arbitrary g ∈ G E k . Due to obvious symmetry, without loss of generality, we can choose a k from {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k }. Yet, then a 2 × 2 not tight subform g appears in g whenever k ≥ 3; see Figure 9 .
Yet, as we already know, 2-wheel E 2 is TT. There are two associated with G E 2 TT game forms; see Figure 5 (in which i + 1 is substituted for i = 0, 1 and 2).
Furthermore, we can strengthen Lemma 19 as follows.
Lemma 20. If E is TT and irreducible then it is a 2-wheel. Proof. Let us fix a prime implicant of E with the largest set of variables, which we will denote, without loss of generality, by
Then, by Lemma 12 (ii), for every j = 1, . . . , k function E contains a prime implicant with the set of variables B j such that B ∩ B j = {a j }. Furthermore, by Lemma 16, |B \ B j | = 1 or |B j \ B| = 1.
Let us assume that k ≥ 3. Then |B \ B j | ≥ 2. Hence, |B j \ B| = 1, that is, B j = {a j , b j } for each j = 1, . . . , k. Moreover, by Lemma 12 (i), all b j must coinside, that is, B j = {a 0 , a j } for each j = 1, . . . , k. In other words, E is a k-wheel with k ≥ 3. Yet, as we already know, in this case E k is not TT. Hence, k = 2, that is, every prime implicant of E has exactly two variables; in other words, E = a 1 a 2 ∨ a 0 a 1 ∨ a 0 a 2 is the 2-wheel.
Thus, all TT irreducible game forms have the same EFF, the 2-wheel. This completes the proof of Theorem 6.
3 Characterizing totally tight game forms 3.1 Canonical partition of a totally tight game form Let g be a TT game form. We know that E for i ∈ {1, 2}, where the first four sets of lines, rows (i = 1) and columns (i = 2), consist of outomes {a 1 , a 2 }, {a 1 , a 3 }, {a 2 , a 3 }, and {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }, respectively, while X 1234 i is the set of lines that contain an outcome a ∈ {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }. Let us notice that X It is easy to see that g(x 1 , x 2 ) = a 1 when
As we already mentioned in Section 2.2, only the following two assignments are feasible in the main diagonal, see Figure 5 , It is not difficult to verify that any mixture of (i) and (ii) is in contradiction with total tightness of g. Due to symmetry, we can fix either (i) or (ii) without any loss of generality. From now on, we will assume that (i) holds, as in Figures 5 , where we substitute only subscript j for a j . , otherwise g is not TT; see Figure 10 . Furthermore, from total tightness of g we also derive that equalities g(x 1 , x 2 ) = a 2 and g(x 1 , x 2 ) = a 3 hold simultaneously when x 1 ∈ X 1234 1 and x 2 ∈ X 23 2 ; see Figure 10 again. The obtained contradiction proves our claim.
Subforms
By the same arguments, we show five similar claims and obtain that g(x 1 , x 2 ) = a 1 when x 1 ∈ X 1234 1 and x 2 ∈ X Let us also notice the following important corollary: if a line contains an outcome a ∈ {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } then this line must contain a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 too. For example, no line can consist of outcomes a 1 , a 2 , a 4 or a 1 , a 2 , a 4 , a 5 only. From total tightness of g we can also derive the following implication. If g(x 1 , x 2 ) = a 3 for some x 1 ∈ X 123 1 and x 2 ∈ X 13 2 then g(x 1 , x 2 ) = a 2 (respectively, g(x 1 , x 2 ) = a 3 ) for the same x 1 and arbitrary x 2 ∈ X 12 2 (respectively, x 2 ∈ X 23 2 ). Indeed, we already know that g(x 1 , x 2 ) equals a 1 or a 2 (respectively, a 2 or a 3 ). Let us assume indirectly that g(x 1 , x 2 ) = a 1 (respectively, g(x 1 , x 2 ) = a 2 ) and choose an arbitrary x 1 ∈ X 12 1 . It is easy to verify that rows x 1 , x 1 and columns x 2 , x 2 result in a 2 × 2 game form that is not tight. Hence, g is not TT and we get a contradiction.
Let subset X a 1 , a 3 and a 3 appears in every its row. (In the next section we will show that a 1 appears in every its row, too.)
Since g is TT, g is also TT, that is, every 2 × 2 subform of g is tight. Hence, by permutations of rows and columns we can transform g so that in every its row outcomes a 3 go first, while a 1 (if any) follow; in contrast, for each column outcomes a 1 (if any) go first, while a 3 (if any) follow; see Figure 3 .4, where standardly j substitutes for a j .
Definitely, the considered subform has a column whose every entry is a 3 (we will call it an a 3 -column). In contrast, a 1 -columns might exist or not (or, more precisely, their existence is not proven, yet). The corresponding two cases are denoted in Figure 3 .4 by the dashed and dottet lines, respectively. By symmetry, applying the same argumets, we will obtain two partitions:
for rows, (i = 1) and columns (i = 2). (5) To do this, first we substitute i = 2 for i = 1 to define subset of columns X 
for rows (i = 1) and columns (i = 2) are given in Figure 3 .4.
Let us remark that the last five sets might be empty, while the first three cannot.
Remark also that the next six subforms have parwise disjoint sets of rows and columns: 
Preliminary remarks
In this Section we analize Figure 3 .4 further to get the next approximation, III, whose table is given in Figure 12 . Let us notice that it contains the table of the approximation I in Figure 11 as a subtable; furthermore, the rest of it is uniquely defined. All these properties we will prove in this section.
The reader should pay attention that, although the tables in Figures 3.4 and 12 are of size 8 × 8, we take into account that in each of the considered two partitions (6) only three from 8 sets are definitely non-empty, X and no others contain an outcome a ∈ {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }. To summarize, in Section 3.4, we computed the entries of subforms respectively, a 2 and a 3 ) . A subform whose each entry is a j will be called an a j -subform.
. By symmetry, we fill subforms X Recall also that the subform X . By definition, subforms X is a a 3 -subform (that is, each its entry is a 3 ). By symmetry, we conclude that subforms X are a 2 -and a 1 -subforms, respectively, as shown in Figure 12 . Now, let us consider rows X contain only outcomes {a 1 , a 2 }, {a 1 , a 3 }, and {a 2 , a 3 }, respectively; see Figure 13 .
